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Abstract 
This paper begins with the idea on examining the market efficiency and corporate 
governance of the most sizable merger and acquisition, amounted to USD38.1 billion, in 
the history of Hong Kong, namely P C C W & C & W H K T . Both companies are highly 
reputable in the region and the merger was widely recognized as a big leap-forward to 
both companies. Some analysts thought that the merger would bring a number of positive 
impacts such as synergic effects, broader market bases, more varieties on products and 
markets and stronger financial position to the combined company. All this optimism was 
reflected in the cumulative abnormal returns of both P C C W and C & W H K T , which were 
once as high as 27.45 percent and 32.45 percent respectively. Unfortunately, the market 
sentiments turned upside-down, the cumulative abnormal returns of P C C W and C & W 
H K T sagged to -16.41 percent and -1 1.57 percent correspondingly two clays after the 
acceptance of the offer by the parent company of C & W H K T . In August, the merger was 
complete and P C C W had successfully raised the huge amount of debt’ U S D 12 billion, 
from the regional banks for the deal. However, the story has not yet ended, scandals of 
P C C W keep spreading the city such as unnoticed changes in accounting treatment and 
falsified biography of Richard Li, the Executive Chairman of P C C W , in its annual report. 
The merger seemed to have done no good to shareholders. Share price of P C C W 
declined from HKS16.0 at the dale of merger to around HKS2.4 as at 10 April 2001. The 
plunge was not only due to the burst of the Information Technology bubble but also the 
series of disappointing moves done by top management of P C C W . 
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Mergers and Acquisitions ( M & A ) have spread all over the world in the past 
decade, especially in the telecommunications industry. A number of impressive M & A 
happened in Europe in the late 1990s such as the merger between the two European 
giant- telecommunications companies, namely Vodafone and Mannesmann. Hong 
Kong is not immune form this M & A fashion. The most stunning one was the 
USD38.1 billion merger, the historical second-biggest in Asia, between the regional 
telecommunication company, Cable and Wireless H K T ( C & W HKT), and the barely 
10-month old Internet company, Pacific Century Cyber Works Limited (PCCW). 
The merger sparked on 11 February 2000, the date that P C C W made an offer 
to Far East ( C & W FE), in purchasing all its 5 4 % holdings in C & W H K T . P C C W was 
set up in M a y 1999 for the sake of the backdoor listing of the territory's controversial 
Cyberport development projects. C & W H K T had been at the heart of Hong Kong for 
more than half a decade providing all sorts of telecommunication services to both 
individual and institutional clients. In this case study, the historical and financial 
backgrounds of two companies are discussed first. In the second chapter, a number of 
reasons for the acquisition are proposed as the general recognized motivations behind 
the merger. In the third chapter, the major events between the proposed date and the 
formal merger date, including the bid made by P C C W , are examined. In the fourth 
chapter, the financial packages are discussed and the authors would adopt the 
abnormal return model to examine the market efficiency of the stock market of Hong 
Kong in response to the news of the merger. To sum up. aftermath of the case is 
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discussed at the end of the paper in which the authors found that there were a few 




Pacific Century CyberWorks Limited 
History 
‘Pacific Century CyberWorks Limited' ( P C C W ) was one of the most 
legendary and influential blue chips in Hong Kong. Its stock price moved like a roller 
coaster, as shown in Figure 1, from approximately H K $ 5 per share at the end of 1999 
to the historical high of roughly H K $ 2 6 in April 2000 and then plunged back to 
around H K $ 5 at the end of 2000. The story was not only composed by the reputation 
of its founder, Richard Li, one of the billionaires in the region, but also the 
astonishing and unprecedented acts that it had done, namely the acquisition of the 
traditional giant regional telecommunications company - Cable & Wireless H K T 
(HKT). 
Figure 1: Stock Price of PCCW 
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P C C W was set up in M a y 1999 by acquiring and renaming a small listing 
company namely "Tricom" in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. The founder of 
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P C C W Richard Li said that "In the simplest terms Pacific Century Group aims to be 
the leading Internet investment vehicle in the Asia-Pacific region, both by acquiring 
and funding net ventures and by developing our own businesses." ^  So, it was once 
very aggressive in acquiring or forming alliances with the other regional or 
multinational Internet companies to achieve its goal. 
The myth started from the M a y of 1999 when Richard Li invested H K D 2.46 
billion in acquiring Tricom Holdings Limited for the sake of the backdoor listing of 
the territory's controversial Cyberport development projects which worth U S D 1.68 
X billion. Basically, it was a property development project. W e would further described 
in the 'Major Business' section. As a result, the stock price of Tricom was 
skyrocketing hundred-fold after the announcement. The newly formed company was 
then renamed as P C C W . 
P C C W has raised the attentions from all over the world. Barely 3 months after 
its birthday, the global chip-producing giant Intel made an announcement in August 
1999 that it would invest US$50 million in P C C W and supply chips, software and 
systems to form the backbone of the new company's broadcast and Internet business. 
The investment, combined with Intel's share of the earlier joint venture “Pacific 
Convergence", would give the chipmaker a 13 percent stake in P C C W . Other than 
that, in September 1999, P C C W and NASDAQ-listed C M G I , the world's largest and 
most diversified network of Internet companies, agreed to a USD350 million equity 
swap. 
1 Interview with Richard Li, by Runckel & Associates December 1999 
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O n 11 February 2000, P C C W has made a quantum leap in its business 
development, it made an offer to the parent company of C & W H K T , the British-hold 
Cable & Wireless Far East ( C & W FE), in purchasing all its 5 4 % holdings in C & W 
H K T . Less than three weeks after making the offer, the British accepted the offer and 
P C C W had outbid its competitor Singapore Telecom. This type of merger and 
acquisition was unprecedented in Hong Kong as P C C W was barely 10 months old 
and had to raise US$12 billion to acquire C & W H K T , which was a huge amount in 
the history of the financial market in Hong Kong. After all, the merger was approved 
by the regulatory bodies, and the shares of C & W H K T was delisted from the S E H K 
on August 8，2000. O n 17 August 2000, P C C W replaced C & W H K T as one of the 33 
blue chips in S E H K . 
With the booming of the global Information Technology-stock market, the 
share price of P C C W had once raised from a penny to the highest HKD28.5 on 
rumors of C & W H K T takeover in February 2001. 
Major Business 
Prior to the acquisition, the principal activities of P C C W and its major 
subsidiaries were investment in and development of technology-related businesses. 
Investment in and development of a project to provide essential infrastructure for the 
formation of a strategic cluster of Information Technology (I.T.) and I.T.-related 
companies (the well-known "Cyberport Project") and investment and development of 
properties in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ( H K S A R ) and the 
People's Republic of China. About 8 0 % of its operating profit in Year 1999 were 
investment income from Internet-related business. 
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To further illustrate, its activities are summarized in the folio wings: 
L Cyberport Project 
Cyberport Project was actually a construction project assigned by the 
government of H K S A R in the wake of catching up the others in the information 
technology development. P C C W was responsible for designing, developing, 
constructing and marketing the Cyberport. The major property developers in Hong 
Kong once complained the deal as the contract went directly to P C C W without 
any formal bidding. The project offered a mix of commercial, business, 
educational and recreational facilities to be completed in stages during 2002-2003. 
The residential portion would be completed in phases during 2004-2007. These 
unites would be for sale. The proceeds, after development and financing costs of 
the whole project, were to be shared by P C C W and the Government of H K S A R . 
2. Network of the World (NOW) 
Generally speaking, N O W was a content provider, it was aiming at combining 
the capabilities of television, personal computer and World Wide W e b by 
integrating television programming with synchronized multimedia content such as 
video clips, animation, graphics and text available on the internet. This was in 
service on 20 June 2000 and a number of popular cable TVs in the region have 
already carried its services such as the Interactive Television Service (iTV) of 
Hong Kong Telecom. 
3, CyberWorks Ventures 
CyberWorks Ventures was the group's investment arm. Its goal was to 
become one of the leading Internet entity in Asia. The division proactively 
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identified key areas for investment, obtained equity stakes in promising Internet 
businesses, took steps to maximize investee companies' growth potential and 
leveraged their technical expertise and worldwide locations. For example, it has 
4.65% stake in Sohu.com, China's first and largest W e b portal and is listed in the 
N A S D A Q market in the United States. 
Performance 
Since the company had only been in service since 1999, there was no 
meaningful internal comparison for the company in terms of financial ratios. However, 
w e could still take a glance at them. 
Table 1: Financial Data ofPCCW, 1998-1999 
Dec. 31,1999 Dec. 3 1 , 1 9 ^ 
Profit after Tax (HK$ million) 353 (61) 
Return on Assets 2.49% (17.79%) 
Return on Equity 3.06% (54.58%) 
Long-Term Debt/Equity 9.43% 16.79% 
Pre-Tax Profit Margin 231.91% (21.67)% 
Current Ratio 4.42X 0.78X 
Earning/(Loss) per share HK$9.99 (HK$13.44) 
Source : 1999 Annual Report ofPCCW 
Referring to the table, there was a significant difference between the ratios in 
1998 and the ones in 1999 and the major reason is that those ratios in 1998 were 
solely reflecting the performance of Tricom. For the fiscal year end 31 December 
1999, P C C W had an exceptionally high Pre-Tax Profit Margin of 231.91%. It was due 
to the fact that it changed its accounting policy in classifying investments as current 
assets instead of the traditional-practice as Long-Term Investments. According to the 
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice of Hong Kong Society of Accountants, if 
an investment was classified as a long-term one, no unrealized gains were allowed to 
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record under the Income Statement. O n the other hand, as P C C W did, by classifying 
the investments as the current assets, the unrealized gains could be considered as an 
income and stated under the Income Statement and that figure was approximately 537 
million in 1999. 
Management of PCCW 
It had been widely accepted that the management of a company was crucial 
for the future of a business. Influences from top management ranged from strategic 
planning to the daily operations of the business. Furthermore, there was a c o m m o n 
goal of management across all types of business, which was to achieve the highest 
value for shareholders. So, as a result, w e thought that it was worthwhile to have a 
layout of the managerial structure of P C C W . 
The Executive Chairman 
Richard Li was the younger son of the Asia Tycoon Li K a Shing and had 
studied computer engineering from Stanford University for 3 years, with one year left 
before the formal graduation. His father, dubbed "superman" by the local press, 
headed the two of the most influential giant companies in Hong Kong which were 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. and Hutchison W h a m p o a Ltd. These two companies 
had interests including property, utilities, container port operation, supermarkets, a 
retail electronics chain and gasoline stations. Having inherited his father's wealth, 
Richard invested U S D 125 million, which was came from his father, in launching Star 
T V in 1990, Asia's first satellite delivered cable television system. After 3 years, in 
1993, he sold the whole business to media baron Rupert Murdoch's News 
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Corporation at U S D 9 5 0 million. That brought Richard Li the capital to set up Pacific 
Century Group in October of that year engaging in developing digital media, financial 
services and infrastructure. Most recently, other listed companies under the group 
include Singapore-listed Pacific Century Regional Developments Limited (PCRD), 
Hong Kong-listed Pacific Century Insurance Limited, and P C C W . The USD38.1 
billion cash and share offer made between P C C W and C & W FE came second 
regarding Merger and Acquisition in Asia, which is after the union of Bank of Tokyo 
and Mitsubishi Bank which amounted to US$38.3 billion. 
Shareholdings Distribution (Prior to the merger) 
CMGI PCG/PCD PCRD Intel Public 
3.24 ^ 52.2»/. 28.7«/c 
PCCW 
Source: Explanatory Statement, Proposed Acquisition Scheme to HKT, 2000 
According to the 2000 interim report of P C C W , Li Tzar Kai, Richard held the 
entire issued share capital of Pacific Century Group Holdings Limited (PCG) and 
P C G indirectly held 75.8 percent of the issued share capital of P C R D . At the same 
time, Li Tzar Kai Richard also held the entire issued share capital of Pacific Century 
Diversified. That means Richard Li had indirectly hold 48.1 percent of P C C W . 
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Cable & Wireless HKT 
History 
Cable & Wireless ( C & W ) (then Cable & Wireless H K T ) had been at the heart 
of Hong Kong since 1936. It provided all sorts of telecommunication services to both 
individual and institutional clients such as fixed line and broadband Internet services. 
Its parent company, Cable & Wireless P L C ( C & W PLC), in which C & W FE was its 
wholly owned subsidiary, was the leading provider of integrated communications 
offering a range of services spanning interactive entertainment and information, 
broadband data, Internet access and television as well as fixed and mobile voice. 
In October 1981, C & W was granted an exclusive 25-year right in operating 
the international telecommunications systems in Hong Kong. However, the 
government of H K S A R had terminated the agreement eight years before the 
termination date of the contract in 1998. The reason was that the government would 
like to liberalize the telecommunication markets, especially the International 
Telephone Services (IDD), the government spent about H K $ 6 billion to retract the 
license granted to Hong Kong Telecom. In 1988, C & W was approved to merge with 
Hong Kong Telephone (HKT) and the combined company was called Hong Kong 
Telecommunications Limited. In the fiscal year 1998/1999, Hong Kong 
Telecommunications was renamed as Cable & Wireless H K T . Prior to the merger, 
H K T was a listed company and 80 percent owned by C & W FE, had the exclusive 
right to provide local public telephone facilities and basic telephone services in Hong 
Kong before the merger. It was thought that the merger could allow C & W to achieve 
greater value, gain benefit of future development and build a local image. Eventually, 
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it was proved by the splendid results of C & W H K T (formally known as Hong Kong 
Telecommunications Limited) after the merger. For the past decades, C & W H K T was 
a cash cow and implemented a high-dividend policy, its mother company, C & W FE, 
had received billions of dividend from C & W H K T . 
Before the acquisition, C & W FE had 5 4 % stake in C & W H K T . C & W FE, as 
mentioned above, was a wholly owned subsidiary of C & W P L C and was founded by 
John Pender, the founder of the Eastern Telegraph Company, started his own business 
in 1872. C & W P L C was playing a major role in the establishment and development of 
telecommunications around the world. C & W P L C had entered the market of Hong 
Kong since 1936 and on 1 October 1981, C & W was established. The Financial 
Secretary Incorporated of the Hong Kong Government and C & W FE had 2 0 % and 
80% stakes in C & W respectively. However, right before the selling of the shares to 
P C C W , C & W FE's shares had dropped to 54% only. According to the Annual Report 
in 2000 of C & W PLC, the reasons for selling the investment were to simplify and 
focus the portfolio, increase financial strength and increase funds for investments to 
execute its strategy. The contribution of C & W H K T in the group's Global turnover 
had dropped from 32% to 2 4 % between 1999 and 2000. 
Major business 
/ . International Telecommunications 
C & W H K T had kept investing in the international network infrastructure. Its 
revenue was not only from providing IDD services to both business and 
residential customers but also by leasing its circuit capacity to others in response 
to the increasing demand of the Internet and data services. 
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2. Local Telecommunications 
C & W H K T had invested a territory-wide all-digit local fixed-line network 
which supported delivery of a wide range of advanced calling features, fax, data, 
Internet and integrated network services. 
3. Mobile Services 
C & W had an excellent and comprehensive infrastructure for the mobile phone 
market, it was widely accepted as the highest-quality service provider in the 
region and played as the leader in terms of market share. 
4. Internet and Interactive Multimedia Services (IMS) & Broadband Services 
C & W H K T had made a significant investment in the world's largest 
asynchronous transfer mode ( A T M ) broadband network and had extended 
coverage during the pervious years to reach more than 75 percent of Hong Kong's 
households and the major business areas. The high-speed configuration was 
specifically designed for the transmission of video-streaming services such as the 
Interactive Television (iTV) services and the Internet, data and voice services. 
Performance 
Table 2: Financial Ratios of C&W HKT in 1999 and 1998 � 
Dec. 31, 1999 Dec. 31, 1998 
Profit after Tax (HK$ million) 11,507 17,028 
Return on Assets 21.3% 31.4% 
Return on Equity 30.3% 46.1 % 
Long-Term Debt/Equity 2.3% 2.0% 
Pre-Tax Profit Margin 40.5% 40.8% 
Current Ratio 1.5X 1.4X 
Earning/(Loss) per share HK$0.964 HK$1.438 
Dividend Payout 88.4% 59.2% 
Source: C&W HKT 1999 Annual Report ‘ 
1 3 
Generally speaking, C & W H K T was a financially sound company, with very 
healthy balance sheets, income statements and cash flow statements. According to 
Table 2，we could see that it enjoyed an exceptionally low percentage of Long-Term 
Debt to Equity, which were only 2.3%. Other than that, it had a very high pre-tax 
profit margin and meanwhile, a remarkable dividend payout ratio. As the higher the 
dividend payout ratio, the more the cash return its parent company, C & W FE, could 
get and according to the Hong Kong Taxation Ordinance, dividend incomes in Hong 
Kong is not taxable. 
Shareholdings Distribution (Prior to the merger) 
China Telecom 
(Hong Kong) C&W FE Public 
Group Limited 
1 0 . 8 % 54.19^. 3 5 . 1 % 
HKT 
Source: Explanaton' Statement, Proposed Acquisition Scheme to HKT, 2000 
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CHAPTER III 
REASONS FOR THE ACQUISITION 
1. Synergy 
As mentioned above, P C C W was striving to become a leading Internet 
company in the Asia-Pacific region, and therefore the skillful employees, the 
technological know-how and extensive infrastructure of C & W H K T would shed a 
light on it. In one occasion, Richard Li said that the deal represented the marriage of 
the head, with the arms and the legs and the body. For example, P C C W had had only 
moderate success signing up local cable operators in China for its broadband project. 
C & W H K T might use its technological know-how to work with China Telecom to 
develop broadband access through local phone lines. 
2. Political Reasons 
To a certain extent, the telecommunication industry was very sensitive and had 
strategic importance. As a result, some analysts thought lhat the quick deal formed 
between C & W FE and P C C W might due to the political pressure from the mainland. 
As it was widely recognized that Li's family had a long-term relationship with the 
Chinese Government, there were rumors that this might be the critical reason for 
P C C W to outbid the other bidder, Singapore Telecom. 
3. Enlarging customer bases 
According to the 1999 annual report of P C C W , the merger would add over 6 
million addressable customers across multiple platforms to his initial target of 
130million cable-enabled homes and another 12 million readily upgradable homes. It 
would also add approximately 3.3 million telephony customers. 1 million wireless 
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customers, 400,000 Internet users, 90,000 interactive television users and 22,000 
broadband customers to his initial target market. This would definitely be a stepping 
stone for P C C W to achieve its goal. 
4. Product & Market expansion 
The merged company would own a large and diversified portfolio of 
investments which, prior to the merger, had been made separately by each of C & W 
H K T and P C C W . These investments had the potential to create value in their own 
right, to facilitate co-operation with strategic partners as well as to provide synergies 
with existing operations through early access to new and developing technologies and 
businesses. These were expected to contribute to the merged company's capability to 
bring new products and services quickly to market. Speed-to-market with new 
applications and services was a necessary competitive advantage in the Internet and e-
commerce sectors. 
5. Huge reserve of cash and resources 
Since it was widely accepted that Internet companies have to burn huge 
amount of cash at the initial stage, acquiring a company which was generating a 
steady cash inflow would ease the pain. C & W H K T had a low debt level and a very 
steady and sound cash inflow every year. For the fiscal year 1999，C&W H K T had 
HK$7,135 million cash and cash equivalent inflow compared with HK$2,936 outflow 
(excluding the proceeds of HK$6,846 million from the issue of new ordinary shares, 
which was not feasible for long-term fund raising purposes) of P C C W . So, some 
economists thought that it might be one of the reasons for P C C W to acquire it. 
However, P C C W had to secure a syndicated loan of approximately US$12 billion to 
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finance the merger and this would bring a significant interest burden to the combined 
company. Regarding this, lots of analysts said that Richard Li might spin off or even 




At the beginning of February 2000, the stock price of P C C W had reached the 
historical high of HK$28.50 on rumors of the C & W H K T takeover. O n 11 February 
2000, P C C W formally made its offer for C & W H K T and reached the agreement with 
C & W FE on 28 February 2000. At the same time, Singapore Telecommunications 
Limited (ST) had confirmed that it had been talking to C & W P L C since the 
November of 1999. 
Competitive bid by SingTel 
ST was the largest company in Singapore and was 78 percent owned by the 
government. Although ST had admitted the bid, the details of the bid had never been 
made public. It raised its initial offer after Rupert Murdoch agreed to invest $l billion 
in ST if the company succeeded in buying C & W H K T . Some analysts said that the 
deal between P C C W and C & W PLC was prompted in part by the support of Beijing-
owned China Telecom, which had 10.8% of C & W H K T . Li, C & W PLC, the 
governments of Hong Kong and China all deny that politics - and pressure from 
Beijing - played a role. A lot of people were not convinced. When a SingTel-C&W 
H K T merger looked imminent in January, Hong Kong politicians began sounding off 
about the Singapore government's influence over C & W H K T . Sin Chung-kai, a 
legislator representing the information-technology industry, accused Singapore of 
trying to buy C & W H K T because its telecom market lagged Hong Kong's and 
expressed fears about possible meddling by Singapore politicians in the merged entity. 
Beijing-controlled newspaper Wenhui Daily weighed in with a report that the central 
government has "indirectly expressed its disapproval of the [SingTel-C&W H K T ] 
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merger." Declared the daily: "If Cable & Wireless intends to sell its stake, there are 
quite a few consortiums in Hong Kong financially strong enough to buy it." 
It escaped no one's notice that a Bank of China subsidiary, BOCI Asia Limited, 
was helping PCCW with its bid, along with European investment bank Warburg 
Dillon Read. Besides that , HSBC abruptly resigned as an adviser to the independent 
directors of C&W HKT. News later broke that its commercial-lending arm would 
lend PCCW money for its bid. A furious ST reportedly threatened to sue HSBC. The 
bank had access to sensitive information about ST's offer because it attended briefings 
for C& W HKT's independent directors. The lawsuit has yet to materialize. 
Arrangement for the US$12 billion loan 
In order to co rnplete the transaction. PCCW had to arrange a huge aInount o f 
loan to finance the deal. Considerin g PCCW. vvhi ch is an Internet start -up . with 
absolute ly no c redit hi story. littl e cash fl ovv and its initial grovv' th fu e ll ed alIllost 
entirel y hy a ~l uck Ill arkcl i"rcnl. Y in tech stocks. it \vas redSOllablc tu thilt" tll lll tile 
loan could be hardl y achie\'ed , Inc redibl y. lat e ly ;' ln er PCCW nlade the deal \vith 
C&W PLC . il s u cce~s i"ull y lubbi ed the !;,lrgesl syndi cated loan c\ 'e r in As ia o f 
appr() \inlate l) LSS 1_ hilli on to rin i. mce the Ill erger. It s igned an agree llle nt for the 
loan \\'ith ~r~ int erni. lti unJ I hank ~ . led h} B;,tnk o f C hin a. HSB C Holdin gs . Barc l;,l Y ~ 
Car ita I a 11 d B N p , T he I () an \ \' ~ IS ll " e d t () III e et the c i. Ish P () rt i () n () r the C &. W H KT () r re r 
and as ad iiti onJ I \\ ' o rkin ~ ci. lpi tal. ~ () t ( nl y the alllount of the IOi. lI1 \Va~ unprecedented 
in As ia but al .. the ri.ll io o f the lea!. ,-\cc () rdi n ~ to the Fi nance \ ~ i a , c o ln . the avcra ue 
~ c 
icbtlEbitda r)!" a Eun pean deal \\'uuld n< t Ill nre lhan ) ,5 linlC\. ho \\'c \-C L the 1 ()~ LIl o f 
PCC\\ ' arried a rali) oi"n ill ' l illle ~ hi. l~ C I nil C\: \\ ' HKT'" Ch il d;, t or S] hi lli ()n , 
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The Composite Document 
O n M a y 26, 2000, C & W H K T posted a detailed circular (the "Composite 
Document") to its shareholders which provided: I) details of the background to and 
terms of the P C C W offer. II) the views of the Board of Directors of C & W H K T . Ill) 
the recommendations of the C & W H K T Independent Board Committee and its 
Independent Financial Adviser, ING Barings Asia Limited. IV) details of the 
proposed Scheme and certain other relevant information. 
It was proposed that, under the Scheme, all C & W H K T Shares in issue at the 
Scheme Record Time would be cancelled and each Eligible Shareholder would be 
entitled to receive, at his option, for his entire holding of C & W H K T Shares at anyone 
of the following basis: 
1. Share Alternative 
For each C & W H K T Share: 1.1 new P C C W shares, valuing each C & W H K T 
Share at HK$15.9 based on the Latest Practicable Date (22 May 2000). 
2. Combination Alternative 
For each C & W H K T Share: US$0,929 (or HK$7.23 based on the Reference 
Rate HK$7.78/US$) in cash and 0.7116 New P C C W Shares, valuing each C & W 
H K S 17.51 based on the closing price of P C C W Shares on the Latest Practicable 
Date (22 May 2000). 
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3, Mix and Match 
Any Eligible Shareholder might choose the Share Alternative in respect of any 
part of his holding of C & W H K T Shares and the Combination Alternative in 




Number of New PCCW Shares 1.10 0.7116 
The closing price of PCCW Shares on 22 May 2000 14.45 14.45 
Equivalent value 15.90 10.28 
Cash (translated at the Reference Rate) -- 7.23 
Value of each C&W HKT Share 15.90 17.51 
Stories Behind the Offers (Prior to the Merger) 
There were about 12.16bn H K T shares in issue at the time P C C W proposed 
the offers, so the maximum amount of cash that would be paid under the offer would 
be US$11.3bn. That's how they arrived at US$0,929 per share. 
The interesting thing about the two alternatives were that, if the share price of 
P C C W fell below HK$18.62, then the Combination Alternative became worth more 
than the Share Alternative. At $18.62, the Share Alternative worth $20.48 while the 
share part of the Combination Alternative worth $13.25, and the cash element worth 
$7.23 (making $20.48, ignoring dealing costs). 
Shareholders were also allowed to apply for an "Increased Cash Election" 
which represented the distribution of any cash element that other shareholders did not 
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want (because they've elected to receive the Share Alternative). In other deals, this 
had been called a "mix and match" election. 
Probable strategy of C&W behind the acceptance 
C&W, the 540/0 shareholder of HKT, had undertaken to choose the 
Combination Alternative and make the Increased Cash Election. If everyone else went 
for the Share Alternative, then C&W would get the whole US$11.3bn (and 11.20/0 of 
PCCW). This undertaking meant that it was a certainty that PCCW would end up 
paying out the full amount of cash if the offer proceeded, and there was no chance 
that they would be able to do the whole deal with paper. The question was not 
whether they would payout the cash, but who got it. 
Besides C&W. there were t\VO large shareholders - China TC\cC()lll and the 
II()n ~ K()IH! ;Vl()net~H\ A uthorit y ( throu~h the E .\chall~e Fund l. It \\ 'ould he' illtere"tin (l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
tu KIlOW whether they had decided to ~lccept the C()lllhin~lti()n 1\lternati\ 'L' ~lIld the 
II III 'I' 'fl)I" I e' ' ~lllle TlIci;t1 10 C(\:\\ ' IIl;lt Ihe PCC\\ ' price did flul 1';111 fllllC h 
iI I y' ill' III d i 11 ~ I h' f I f\. \ 1: \ ; III I C Il i fl ; I T e' le c () Ill ) \ \, ' () ul d e k c I 1'0 r the 
~ I1lhinaliul1 :\ Il I'n;lll\ ' r illll Iy fl I ;1' 'LPl ), Th ~ll \\ ollld !c;l\ 'C C ,, \\ ' \\' ilh only 
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C & W had already said that it would sell 4 % (around US$2.5bn) of P C C W "as 
soon as practical following completion of the Offer". This would take it below 2 0 % 
which was important to the accounting treatment of the disposal. If C & W ' s stake in 
P C C W is less than 2 0 % then it is accounted as an "investment" while 2 0 % or more 
makes it an "associate". As an investment, C & W could carry it at cost (and book a full 
profit on the sale of H K T ) rather than writing off the enormous amount of goodwill in 
P C C W that equity accounting an associate would require. 
C & W had also agreed with C M G I to swap of US$500m of P C C W stock 
(about 1% of the enlarged company) for the same amount of new C M G I shares. Out 
of the CyberWorks (you heard that term here first) and into the frying pan, you might 
think, but at least it's diversification. 
If the P C C W price stayed above the crossover point and C & W was able to get 
all of the US$11.3bn in cash and 11.2% of P C C W , then by placing 4 % and swapping 
1% with C M G I it would be down to 6.2% of P C C W , or around 1.4bn shares. 
Other than that, C & W had agreed not to sell any more for 6 months and then 
hold at least half its original holding (5.6%) for a further 6 months. 
It was notable that there were not any other major telecommunications players 
entering the fray. C & W signaled its willingness to deal in early February with the 
announcement of the proposed merger with Singapore Telecom, so there was plenty 
of time for others to raise a hand by now. W e might have expected major players such 
as British Telecom (which already has a stake in SmarTone) or A T & T (which once 
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had a stake in SmarTone), Deutsche Telekom or M C I Worldcom to have made a pJay. 





Table 3: Summary of the financing package was listed as the following:-
Acquisition of H K T H K $ bi^ [Fund Sources 
Net Assets Acquired 49.36 Cash 88.14 
Goodwill 171.60 Issuance of 132.82 
8,653,056,000 N e w 
Shares @ HK$15.35  
Total 220.961 |Total 220.96 
PCCW Equity Fiinding 
The major contributing factor for why P C C W could grow from a start-up to an 
Asia telecommunication giant was its amazing ability to raise funds from the capital 
markets. In the 9 months before the announcement of the merger, P C C W has 
conducted five share placements and a US$50 million issue to Intel, raising an 
estimated total of US$2,377 million net of expenses, as shown in the table below: 
Announced Shares $/share Gross HK$m Net HK$m Net US$m Use of Fund  
3-May-99 1 .151 ,056 ,000 0.31 357 3 2 9 42 .3 Acquisition ofTricom (then 
P C C W ) 
Aug-99 7 7 . 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 3 8 9 3 8 9 50 . 0 Invest in Pacific 
Convergence Corporation. 
Ltd. in order to enable it to 
purchase equipment from 
Intel 
13-Sep-99 4 1 4 . 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 5 .55 2 ,298 2 ,247 288 .8 Operational launch and 
development of" the business 
of Pacific Century 
Convergence Corporation 
Ltd.", a 6 0 % owned 
subsidiary of P C C W 
>3-Oct-99 668，863，000 6 . 1 0 4 , 0 8 0 3 .992 513.1 Investment in SoftNet 
Systems 
25-Jan-OO 2 4 8 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 15.80 3 ,918 3 ,833 492 . 7 Investment in C M G I Asia 
and the implementation of 
its business plan 
14-Feb-OO 335,000,000 23.50 7,873 7,704 990.2 Merger between PCCW 
and HKT 
2 , 894 , 719 , 000 18,914 f ^ ~ 
Note: the above table assumes that the over-allotment option for the placing announced on M-Feb-00 
will be exercised. 
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PCCW Loan Funding 
The merger was a classical leverage buyout case, which was one of the largest 
deals of such kind in the M & A history. P C C W lined up a 364-day bridging loan of 
US$12 billion in size in order to finance the merger. Effective interest rate of the 
bridging loan was around 6.5%. Compared with some analysts' valuation of US$21.9 
billion for H K T , this loan amounted to 5 5 % of value. This was also equivalent to the 
sum of the US$11.3 billion cash element of the offer and the US$0.7 billion dividend 
that H K T will pay out. 
P C C W on 12 April 2000 announced that a memorandum of agreement was 
made with Telstra to sell a 4 0 % interest in something it had yet to own, the C & W 
H K T wireless business. The deal also includes a US$1.5 billion convertible loan from 
Telstra. The transaction represented the building up of strategic alliance between 
P C C W and Telstra. The purpose of the deal, from P C C W ' s perspective, was to use 
the proceeds from selling the H K T asset to pay down part of the huge debt amounting 
US$12.0 billion raised to acquire C & W H K T . 
The strike price of the option embedded in the convertible loan was at 
HK$23.69 per share, a price at which P C C W shares only briefly touched before their 
unstoppable dive. P C C W had to pay interest at 3 % p.a. quarterly stepping up to 5 % 
p.a. after 4 years. At Telstra's option, half the loan note could be redeemed after 4 
years, and the rest after a further 2 years. P C C W could only force the note to convert 
after 4 years if the share price (averaged over 15 days) exceeded $28.43, or after 6 
years if the share price (again averaged) exceeded $26.06. This looked almost 
impossible from today's perspective following the burst of Internet bubble. 
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The Telstra debt is subordinate to the US$12bn loan advanced by Bank of 
China and colleagues for the C & W H K T takeover. Unless the P C C W share price got 
up above the conversion price, Telstra would order its money back. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
The merger of P C C W and C & W H K T was so far the second largest M & A 
transaction ever in Asia, and therefore had drawn much attention from the society and 
the investment public. W e believed that by analyzing the effects of the corporate 
announcements on the stock price of the companies at various time periods during the 
process of the transaction, we would be able to reveal a significant part of the picture 
regarding market efficiency in Hong Kong's securities market. 
Market Efficiency 
To analyze the effects, the first question was actually when and how fast the 
market reacted to the M & A announcement, that was market efficiency. There were 
three forms of market efficiency: strong form market, semi-strong form market and 
weak form market. Definitions of the forms of market are as the folio wings:-
• Weak-form efficient market, in which historical share-price data obtained no 
information that can be used to earn profits in excess of those produce by a naive 
buy-and-hold strategy. 
• Semi-strong form efficient market，for which the stock market steadily and 
accurately incorporates all publicly available information into share prices. The 
only way to make profits in excess of a buy-and-hold strategy is to have inside 
information. 
• Strong-form efficient market, for which the stock market and its quoted firms 
are so well regulated that no substantial and consistent use of inside or 
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monopolistic information can be made. Whilst there is bound to be some use of 
inside information, there is so small that it does not disturb the market efficiency. 
Research found that more developed stock markets, such as U.S., Japan, 
Europe, and Hong Kong, were semi-strong form markets. The semi-strong form of the 
efficient markets model implied that investment analysts were valuing securities 
effectively, with share prices giving accurate values by which resource allocation can 
be optimized. 
Methodology 
The methodology we used in our analysis was the one that directly tests the 
semi-strong version of the efficient markets theory. The test set out to see if the stock 
market accurately and speedily adjusted share prices on the release of fundamental 
information. The methodology used in our research followed that used by Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll in their analysis of stock splits. This involved comparing 
actual share price performance against that expected, after removing the general price 
influence. The difference between the actual and predicted prices are represented by 
the term U „ = R, , -
Where R丨 t is the actual proportionate change in the share price of security j in 
time period t and the p丨R^ ., term is the price predicted by the market model, p丨 is the 
volatility of the share price to changes in the market index and is found by regressing 
the proportionate (or logarithmic) changes in the share price of security j on 
proportionate (or logarithmic) changes in a market index.尺丨几，is the actual 
proportionate change in the index. 
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W e would analyze the error residuals (Uj ,) and the cumulative total of these, in 
order to ascertain the impact of the news on prices and whether this adjustment was 
done quickly and accurately in a theoretical sense. M a n y past studies found that the 
stock market reacted in the right and expected direction, and that the adjustment was 
completed in a very short period of time. 
+ 10 
l=-10 
CUj.t is the cumulative error residuals or cumulative abnormal returns. 
Announcements 
O n 11 February 2000, P C C W made a formal offer to C & W H K T . O n 14 
February 2000，the next trading date after the announcement, the share price of C & W 
H K T surged to HK$26.40 from HK$21.65, representing an increase of 21.9%. 
Abnormal return due to the announcement was 22.94% and cumulative abnormal 
return was high at 27.45%. Although share price of P C C W remained unchanged on 
14 February 2000, it increased by almost 7 % to HK$26.35 on the next trading date, 
achieving a record high closing price ever. Abnormal return on the day was 8.82%, 
which raised the cumulative abnormal return to 32.54%. 
Within the period of our study i.e. 10 days before and 10 days after the 
announcement date, cumulative abnormal return was 26.10% and 13.68% respectively. 
The high abnormal returns reflected the positive expectation of investors on the 
merger of the two companies. Shareholders of both companies believed that the 
merger would create synergy and benefit to them. 
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O n 28 February 2000, P C C W successfully outbid the other competitor, 
SingTel, and agreement was made between P C C W and C & W H K T on the merger. 
Trading was suspended for both companies on 29 February 2000. O n 1 March 2000, 
share price of C & W H K T and P C C W dropped respectively by 12.33% and 7.90%, 
with abnormal return of -10.56% and -6.49% respectively. Cumulative return as at 1 
March 2000 for C & W H K T and P C C W was-11.57% and-16.41% respectively. 
Within the period of our study i.e. 10 days before and 10 days after the 
announcement date, cumulative abnormal return was -12.88% and -15.53% 
respectively. The negative abnormal return might due to change in shareholders' 
expectation. Shareholders might find that they had overestimated the possible synergy 
that could be created by the merger of the two companies. Therefore price 
adjustments were happened to both companies to correct the overshot share prices as 




The merger of the telecommunication giants seemed to have done no good to 
shareholders of both P C C W and C & W H K T . Share price of P C C W declined from 
HK$16.0 at the date of merger to around HK$2.4 as at 10 April 2001. For 
shareholders of C & W H K T , provided that they rationally chose the combination 
alternative in which they were offered HK$7.23 plus 0.7116 P C C W share, the total 
value remained in hands would be around HK$8.94. The remaining value was 
significantly lower than the C & W HKT's closing price of HK$16.7 at the last trading 
date. Some people might argue that the evaporation of value was due to the 
worldwide sentiment on T M T stocks and P C C W should not be supposed to immune 
from that. In the following analysis, we would discuss the reasons for the fall. 
Financial Performance 
In March 2 0 0 L P C C W announced the second largest loss for Hong Koim 
company ever af ter Akai Hold ings ' H K $ I 3 . 4 0 b . The financial results of P C C W lor 
the year ended 3 1 December 2000 revealed that the c o m p a n y made an operat ing profit 
of H K $ 5 2 0 million. However , an one-off provision for the reduced value of some of 
the c o m p a n y ' s investment in Internet stocks and the wri t ten-off goodwil l arising f rom 
the merger, had dragged P C C W lo a net loss of HKS6.90b. A fie^citive equity of 
HKS14.1 billion was reported. The company , in 2000, paid a total of HKS2.36 billion 
in interest alone. The amount was expected to increase fur ther to HKS3.82 billion in 
2001 according to the forecast of P C C W . Together with the expected capital 
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expenditure of around HK$4.12 billion, the cash burden on the company would still 
be huge in 2001. 
What Went Wrong? 
Apart from the global slump of T M T stocks, we believed that the poor 
performance of P C C W was due to following five major reasons. 
1. Fierce competition in the deregulated Hong Kong telecommunication 
market 
Telephone line operation was one of the major income sources of P C C W . 
Before the deregulation in 1999，C&W H K T had long enjoyed its monopolistic 
right to operate domestic and international calls. As the markets were open up for 
competitors, competition has been intensifying and decline in revenue from 
operating telephone lines seemed inevitable. In 2000, IDD traffic for P C C W 
dropped by 34%, which was beyond expectation of many analysts. W e expected 
that the competition would further erode the former cash cow when new entrants 
and substitutes were coming up. 
2. Lack of self-producing content of quality for NOW 
Some people viewed that the merger of P C C W and C & W H K T was a carbon 
copy of Time Warner and A O L , as both cases were merger of content and 
delivery infrastructure. In our opinion, the major difference between the two cases 
was the difference in quality of content. First, Time Warner was a world 
renowned content production company with many famous brand names, movies, 
magazines, cartoon characters, etc. However. P C C W has yet developed a mature 
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content development center and was totally dependent on licensing of content 
from other producers. Though it has already invested in its production centers in 
London, Japan, Hong Kong and India, the investment was still not generating 
results. Second, 
3. Questionable strategic development direction 
In order to become less dependent on fixed line businesses, P C C W has put a 
lot of efforts on developing as a total network and system solution provider by 
means of acquisition e.g. acquire HTTIL and huge capital expenditure. In fact, we 
believe that P C C W just entered into another battlefield competing with some 
global experienced players. This time, competition was not just from some local 
companies with limited financial backup, but networking giants like Cisco 
Systems, IBM, and S U N , which have long been rooted in the market. That was 
therefore the reason why many analysts voiced out that the firm's real opportunity 
was in capitalizing on its three-million customer base and becoming the provider 
of all communications services within the home. 
4. Difficult to re engineer culture after merger 
People could easily be able to expect that there was a huge gap between the 
culture of P C C W and C & W H K T . C & W H K T was an old-fashioned British 
utility company that was long protected by its monopoly. Marketing and business 
development was never an important issue in the company. For P C C W , it was an 
internet/technology company where performance linked with rewards. People in 
the company had to deal with dynamic market changes and respond in no time to 
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unprecedented and unpredictable issues. Therefore, w e believed that there were 
difficulties in consolidating the culture. 
5. Depth of experience of management 
W e had little doubt about the competency of the management in playing 
games in the financial markets, as quite a number of people in the management 
team were from investment banks. That's why they were able to complete the 
largest M & A mission in Asia outside Japan. However, to handle a company after 
merger, which was facing a lot problems namely market deregulation, culture 
reengineering, new business strategy design, P C C W might require managers with 
different experience. Therefore, suggestions were made that Richard Li might 
need to step into non-executive position and/or hire experienced managers to 
handle various issues. 
Economic and Corporate Governance 
Like 111 any other Asian countr ies . Hong Kong has been long crit icizing its 
economic and corporate governance . Af ter the Asian financial crisis, as many Asian 
corporat ions col lapsed due to ""crony capi ta l i sm" and •"agency problems" , investors 
and general public in Hong Kong have shown intensi fying concern about governance 
in the SAR. Many studies showed thai poor economic and corporate governance were 
attributed to the dominat ion of the corporate sector by a few politically strongly 
bonded families. In Hong K o n g � t o p five families control 26% of the market 
capitalization, and 669r of the companies are controlled by families. 
The impact on economic policy by Ihc strong family-conlrollcci cconoiny 
could not be underrated. The most obvious one was that prcrercnlial Irealnicnls were 
given to family businesses, especially families that were controlling blue-chips 
companies. Impact was also placed on the development of legal and regulatory 
systems. If a small number of families dominate the corporate sector and the 
government is heavily involved in and influenced by business, then the legal system 
might not protect promote competition or protect minority shareholders. Studies 
showed that the concentration of corporate control has had a major negative impact on 
the evolution of the legal system. (Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)) 
In this case study, we could see some issues regarding economic and corporate 
governance happened in the merger of P C C W and C & W H K T , and related issues 
afterward. 
/. Cyberport Project 
The Hong Kong Cyberport project has revealed the notorious cronyism due to 
the close connection between the S A R government and the ‘'families: The issue 
represented poor economic governance - the granting by Government of a huge 
property development to a single party without a tender. The decision was heavily 
criticized by the general public and the major property developers in Hong Kong, 
as the majority of the floor area of the Cyberport project would be used for 
residential purpose. Should Cyberport project not offered to P C C W , Tricom (then 
P C C W ) may never have been transformed into P C C W as the injection of the 
lucrative project would not happen. 
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2. Unnoticed Change in Accounting Methods 
A change of accounting methods for the interim financial report ended 30 June 
2000 described by analysts as a dressing-up exercise has seen P C C W report a 
smaller than expected interim loss of H K $ 3 5 million. Analysts initially expected a 
net loss of up to HK$250 million. Provided that the two accounting changes were 
stripped out, P C C W would have reported a yearly loss at HK$1.5 billion. 
The first change in accounting was a re-classifying long-term holdings into 
short-term investments. This could in fact capitalize a HK$562 million unrealized 
investment gain, mainly from its 3.8% interest in Tom.com (an internet company 
owned by Richard Li's father) and its holding in C M G I . What made it interesting 
was that P C C W in March announced that such investments would be held for 
'long-term strategic purposes'. It also said its policy was not 'to book unrealized 
gains on investment securities'. The change in accounting policy in just a few 
months was undoubtedly unfair to investors, especially minority shareholders, 
who were not insider of the company. 
P C C W also capitalized a US$ 130 million investment for developing Network 
of the World (NOW), its convergence television and multimedia service. 
3. Share Transaction With Hutchison Telecommunications Technology 
Investments Ltd. (HTTIL) 
On 22 February 2001, P C C W announced that the company has entered into 
the Sale and Purchase Agreement with Hutchison Telecom, an indirect wholly 
owned subsidiary of Hutchison which in turn was controlled by Mr. Li Ka Shing, 
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father of Richard Li. P C C W agreed to acquire all the issued share capital of 
HTTIL and the shareholder's loan from Hutchison Telecom for a total 
consideration of HK$803.4 million. The consideration would be satisfied in full 
by issuance and allotment of shares in the company at the price of HK$4.375 per 
share, a discount of around 6.3% to average closing price on the 20 trading dates 
up to and including the date of announcement. 
HTTIL, formerly known as Pacific Century Technology Investment Ltd., was 
originally owned by Pacific Century Group (PCG) and sold to the Hutchison 
Group in 1995 for approximately HK$579.6m. Though P C C W claimed that the 
deal was made on an arm's length basis and acquiring HTTIL would enable 
P C C W to offer a complete portfolio of solution by including HTTIL's satellite-
based network solution, two issues were noted in this transaction. 
First，insufficient information was disclosed to justify the price appreciation of 
HK$223.8 million since P C G sold the business to Hutchison Telecom. Second. 
The merger would definitely avoid direct competition between P C C W and HTTIL. 
Before C & W H K T was acquired by P C C W , Hutchison Telecom (new entrant) 
had competed fiercely in almost every battlefield in the telecommunication 
industry with C & W H K T . This in fact promoted competition in the industry and 
enhanced the overall competitiveness of the industry participants. 
4. Inaccurate Biography of Richard Li 
In April 2001, a scandal regarding P C C W was uncovered and publicized 
throughout the media. Richard Li, the president of P C C W , was found and later 
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admitted that he did not graduate from Stanford, contrary to claims previously 
made in P C C W biographies and the group web site. Although P C C W emphasized 
that the claim was not made "in public disclosures filed by the Company in 
accordance with applicable legal requirements". However, it was found that the 
degree claim has been made in both the U S and Singapore in legal filings of 
documents for which Richard Li was responsible. 
W e believed that any statements made by a company, whether or not they are 
filed with regulators, should be made to the same standard of care, accuracy and 
truthfulness. To place this "emphasis" on legal filings as opposed to other 
statements brings into question the importance the group attaches to its other 
public statements. In fact, the same "mistakes" happened in many occasions, 
namely in various prospectus and filings to S E C and SFC. The scandal did not 
only reflect the insufficient corporate governance but also the powerless 
regulatory system in Hong Kong. So far, no action has been taken to deal with the 
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APPENDIX Vn Abnormal Return for PCCW
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APPENDIX Vn Abnormal Return for PCCW
 Before and After Agreement Announcement on 2000/2/28 
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